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The Eucken Review

(Organ of the Eucken Society)

No. 8/12 AUGUST/DEZEMBER 1923



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THE EUCKEN REVIEW

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For and against Hegel.

By **Rudolf Eucken.**

Our attention has lately been drawn to the greatness of Hegel's philosophy, for, if we want to understand our present time it is of some importance to discuss the question: why just now the influence of Hegel is growing even beyond the frontiers of Germany throughout the whole intellectual world. The more we feel a weakness, inherent to our time, the more we are inclined to attach our thinking to Hegel's way of thinking, hoping to find in him what our time particularly wants but cannot accomplish. The enormous dissensions of the present time cause a growing desire for more unity and consistence, a longing for harmony in life. Hegel joins unity to an imposing development: to consider life as constantly moving step by step to higher perfection. Thus each individual achievement gets its peculiar importance; but the final aim is to elevate man above his individual existence, above his interest for individual and general human welfare. Hegel has subjected human ways and doings to a severe criticism by acknowledging an independent spiritual life that transforms and rules the whole material world. By spiritualising this world, all things are closely linked together. This spirit pervades and elevates all branches of society and history; only the superior energy of a philosopher like Hegel was able to see all this multifarious reality under one common aspect.

But Hegel clearly demonstrates that heavy dangers are attached to all greatness of man. We should get quite false ideas, if we should look at these advantages only without considering those dangers. The A and O of Hegel's philosophy is its spiritual character. To decide for or against Hegel is therefore dependent on our accepting or refusing this fundamental idea of a spiritual life. It was especially great in Hegel's philosophy that the idea of a spiritual world was with the utmost consequence placed above all human argumentation and was thus established as an independent world with its own inherent laws; spirituality is entirely concentrated in thinking; the chief task is to find one principle which unites and concentrates the variety of thoughts, thus establishing the predominance of the spiritual over the material world; only the power of thought is irresistible. But it is a fatal mistake that in Hegel's philosophy the terms spirit and thinking are identical in meaning; for this means that form and motion of the thinking process are identical with thinking itself and reality is explained as produced by motion only, the consequence is the predominance of an unlimited intellectualism, which — though its importance cannot be denied — gives a one-sided and wrong idea of reality and contradicts the independence of spiritual life.

This is the point where we have to make a clear distinction between Kant and Hegel. The greatness of Kant was to build up a free and independent spiritual world which he based on ethics alone, thus uniting the multitude of tendencies. In his argumentation however he is influenced by the moralism of the 18th century; but he never denied the fundamental principle of an independent and productive spiritual life. According to Hegel the ethical task of man is an absolute devotion to the intrinsic truth of productive ideas which follow their own laws, regardless of the welfare of individuals; he is a perfect man who submits his own will to the purposes of a higher will, thus ethical ideas help to promote the progress of civilisation, but there is no independent ethical sphere. This conception of Hegel takes ethics as a mere instrument to promote the progress of civilisation; he speaks of an ethical process, of the ethics of single individuals, but he denies the existence of an independent ethical sphere that is above the subjective moral of individuals and above this world of reality. By denying an independent ethical world he submits the individual to an impersonal power, which can best be seen from his attitude towards the State. Hegel is for a good deal responsible for the preponderance of the State, the influence of which endangers the independence and originality of spiritual life. He considers the State as a realisation of God's will that has organised this world as an embodiment of his greatness, he glorifies the State as a "Irdisch-Göttliche" (earthly Godlike) institution, he does not set bounds to the State. He declares that there is no reason and no right that goes before that of the State. Pointing

to Socrates he declares: "the individual has to submit to the community, and that the real and noblest and most powerful community is the people." This way of thinking is rather optimistic as far as it identifies this community with the noble and the good. Hegel himself was no democrate, but it is evident that the final consequence of this overestimation of the State is an overestimation of democracy and of masses to the worst of personality and liberty. These principles are applied to history, all is derived from the community and returns to it, all the value of an individual is measured by his achievements for the community, personality is a mere instrument of historical development. It is the community that strives at full authority, using the individuals for its own purposes and denying them all independence of their own: in Hegel's formulation: "He who pronounces what his contemporaries want and carries it through is the great man of the day."

But is greatness only arising out of the vague darkness of the masses? Is there not a great distance between the creative work of a genius and the doings of an average man? The work of a genius does not result from the co-operation of average persons, but from a miraculous union of faculties that rise out of the depths of the own soul and transcendental powers. The genius is continually fighting against the stupid, indolent and sometimes malicious average man; it is a tragical fight, for Sokrates and Jesus were condemned not by individuals but by masses. Spiritual movements will only emerge from darkness and irresolute fluctuation when embodied in a creative personality that moulds them according to his own individuality. Hegel's philosophy is based on the conviction that this world is ruled by reason, that reason is a reality and reality is reasonable. But this can be true only with regard to the reality of formal reason and the truth of logical reasoning. To this we have to object that certainly a strong belief that reason must be active as the ultimate basis of the reality is indispensible but that mankind can ascend to the higher levels of reality only by violent revolutions and evolutions. Not a mere philosophical meditation as we find it with Hegel but only an activity rooted in the whole life of nature will promote this ascend. Our present time certainly has every reason to acknowledge the irrationality of historical reality; though we are not pessimists we are far from rationalistic optimism. From the standpoint of Activism we have to understand life not as a thing to meditate over but as a constant fight for an ever deepening understanding and ever growing evolution of our being.

With his rationalistic optimism, based on history, Hegel is convinced that what is true will in the end succeed, but that success will come when its time comes, and therefore it will neither come too soon nor come to an immature public. To this we oppose with the single question: Did heroes and martyrs like Sokrates and Jesus find a mature public? A consequent optimism of this kind will necessarily render all branches of life rational and abstract and transforms it into a philosophy of rational thinking, thus the main task of art would be reflection and determination, that of religion to illustrate the absolute process of thinking, that of education to develop intellectualism. All this means that rationalism rules our life. We fully acknowledge that intellectualism is understood broadmindedly, but nevertheless there remains onesidedness and danger of taking abstract, shadowy ideas for living reality. Hegel's greatness was to proclaim the spiritual world as the higher world and to place all utilitarianism, pragmatism, psychologism on the lower levels. But by identifying form and substance of thinking he has much helped to pave the way for intellectualism, optimism and socialism, he has helped to unchain mighty, even demoniac powers, which our present time cannot cope with. There can be no doubt that Hegel was a great man representing the tendencies of his time in his philosophy, but this philosophy was at the same time a misfortune to us all. Shall we be able to master it by a superior Activism?

(Translated by R.)

The Inner Culture of the Ego and its Consequences for Life.

By **Alfred Biese.**

It is getting clearer to us, day by day, that Europe is bankrupt in civilisation in consequence of the late war and its operations. Only a genius of the highest order could cope against the chaos that we see everywhere, and it is difficult for a simple minded being still to believe in a wisdom of reason and to have confidence in the higher development of mankind at all. Everything that seemed holy and reliable to us is now open to incredulous criticism. Power and not righteousness and justice rule the political life of all nations; and the moral and spiritual life of the people shows a decline, which leading authorities felt and prognosticated before the war. The brilliancy of exterior culture, as the well-

known Wilhelm Münch wrote, also casts a shadow which falls into the mind of man. But before all other authors Rudolf Eucken saw a catastrophe coming. In the first edition of his works, in „Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion" he wrote: Wir richten uns an die, welche mit uns die gegenwärtige Verflachung und Verflüchtigung des Geisteslebens als einen nicht länger erträglichen Notstand empfinden und die nicht davor zurückscheuen, auch in schroffem Widerspruch zur breiten Zeitoberfläche eine Erneuerung des Lebens zu suchen."

Since 1901 the way leads nearer and nearer to the edge of an abyss. A call to return to nature, simplicity and truth went through the country. The European individual must once more remember eternity, must return to reason after a period of mistakes, must cut itself loose from the nonentities and the flatness of present day interests. The problem of the formation of the essential Being, which is the root of Eucken's system, must lead to a renewed strength. It is not so much a problem of theory, as a way to form and shape life with moral strength. All depends upon this one great question. Are you only a natural or a spiritual Being? If you decide for the former you do not then consider yourself more than the plants or animals or more than the nave of the ocean that comes and goes and you belong to materialism, that has no religion and no ideas and to socialism that has no part in History. If you decide for spiritual life, then you never deny your dependence on nature and fate, but you are lifted above nature through the thinking spirit and feel a longing for unity of life, as a complete personality. You are placed before this simple alternative: Will you take part in or turn aside from the formation and cultivation of your essential Being? There is an independent, active, spiritual life, a cosmic process of life which shows its own forces and its own laws and so exercises a forming activity in all variations far beyond the dreams and capabilities of men. Spiritual life is no abstract idea, for intellectualism gives neither foundation, nor value to life, only living truth can do so, for only life in its innermost reality can show us our relations to the world and to ourselves.

The very desire to lead an independent, spiritual life makes man not only a partaker, but also a joint worker of true reality. This inner life can be compared to yeast which is added to raise flour — or to artistic modelling which inspires its subject and gives it a soul, thereby spiritualizing the object by form and so wiping away any contact existing between matter and thought.

This must be looked upon in life, as the foundation which, invisibly, carries and holds together the visible world. Such an inherent, infinite life in the spirit of man has something mysterious and mystical, it must not be taken for peace and quietude, but, as Eucken always demands with renewed eloquence, as a duty to work and create a world of activity, as an awakening of Life's highest energy and a formation of the essential Being which spreads its consequences everywhere. It means a struggle, an everlasting dying and giving birth to a transcendental reality to such a spiritual life as will lift mankind above its own self and which is constantly growing in relation to national political life, science, art, religion, and action.

The formation of the essential Being does not only influence spiritual, or intellectual (speculative or investigating) life, or a life only willing to act by character and temperament, but takes man entirely as a unity — a microcosmos. It looks for the deeper causes in every single sphere of life, so as to overcome the dissensions in Religion and morality, or in the hopeless chaos of politics, or in social ethics that, in wishing to enlighten the burden of material misery forgets what is of essential and vital importance: in moral and intellectual life, or on the ground of education. whence the imparting of knowledge must not put aside real ability, and self activity, nor allow superficiality to suppress what is important, for instance in art. In art at the one time, naturalism or symbolism, or expressionism may dominate, though, acknowledgement of the essential in art is to realize the soul in material form, or to feel the material form etherialized by inspiration — a transfusion of the sensual and spiritual life must lead to heroical activity, or, with other words, to ethical heroism. Action is the principle thing not thought, feeling, phantasy nor mind, but powerful activity which is directed by ethical motives.

Selfknowledge, selfconsciousness, and selfcommand lead the way to this life. These develop the moral forces, responsibility, quick resolutions and personal courage even to risk life.

Like an arch which spans and covers a dome, so veneration must spread over the entire spiritual life of God's universe. This spiritual life we should try to realize with all the inherent power and ability given to our human souls.

(Translated by Elinor Biese née Gladstone.)

Proximate Causes of Nietzsche's Opposition to Christianity.

By Dr. phil. **Elise Lohmann,** München.

Whoever will devote a few hours' study to Nietzsche's books will easily find out to what an extent the words: fragment, incoherence, contradiction, antithesis, exaggeration, fanaticism, emphasis, opposition, distortion, suggestion, spontaneity, and other such characterize this capricious philosopher's thoughts. On the other hand every impartial, unprejudiced reader will often be struck by the fact that innumerable blows of this merciless, embittered and passionate critic strike home and in how many cases his sharp virulent assaults, his severe and sarcastic accusations reveal a vigilant and keen observer, a genuine and enlightened prophet. Owing to Nietzsche's ambiguousness none of his numerous interpreters, up to the present day, have really followed this powerful mind to the very root of its thoughts and have given the right explanation of this sagacious judge's striking paradoxes and subtle criticisms, in spite of sincere endeavour and indefatigable scrutiny. To mention but one thing: during the "Great War", Nietzsche was loudly accused of having been the "War inspirer", the incarnation of "German Will to Power", barbarism, cruelty and false nationalism. More recent publications return to justice and distinctly show how blind and mistaken these war-inspired accusers had been, and with how much success the author of Zarathustra, who always enriched his statements by an examination of the antithesis of his assertions, may be looked upon as an apostle of universal peace and far reaching internationalism. Taking into consideration how many subjects and statements are underlined in Nietzsche's works, contradicting opinions will always be published, and we shall hardly be wrong in saying that this ingenious writer will occupy the minds, disquiet and irritate the critics as long as philosophical topics will continue to interest humanity.

Now to the point of our investigations! What about Nietzsche's standpoint with regard to Christianity? What is the result of the manifold conscientious enquiries into his aversion to the doctrine of Christ? There is no denying the fact, Nietzsche's intense hatred of Christianity was the chief impulse of this aggressive advocate's vindication of naturalism and paganism, it forms the background of the greatest number of his moral researches and demands; for morality together with culture was the leading principle of all the investigations and aspirations of this ill-reputed "Immoralist". But, notwithstanding all his energetic struggles and battles for so good, so noble and so high a cause, up to the present day, Christianity never had been interpreted, calumniated, denied, condemned, and as far as this is possible, annihilated by such vigorous, such hateful, and such passionate blows as the creator of the "Blonde Beast of Prey" has flung at it with incessantly increasing rage. Nevertheless, let us not forget, Nietzsche's aversion and hatred of Christ's doctrine was based on moral grounds. According to his most appreciated critics, Nietzsche was religious by birth and nature. Apart from this fact, as the son of a Lutheran pastor, he had been subject to religious influence and agreed with christian principles up to the time when he entered academic life. From his early childhood to the moment when his mind gave way, he longed for an object of veneration, his will was inspired by ideals, his heart was filled with an ardent desire to help, to raise and to save humanity, be it even by sacrificing the mass to the individual, and as to aspirations to eternity, did they not find expression in his theory of eternal recurrence?

Nietzsche grew up at a time when naturalism and materialism prevailed, when technic and arts had the upper hand. His tender and sensitive nature, against which he fought with admirable perseverance, as long as his strength permitted, rendered him very liable to influence, so we may not be wrong in supposing that notwithstanding his early and strong inclination to independance and individualism, in more than one respect, he was the son of his country, the child of his time. He was the more so with regard to his moral and religious development. At the age of four Nietzsche lost his father, a man of remarkable knowledge and education, of broad views and worldly wisdom, a sincere believer and "a faithful servant before the Lord". Had he lived, who knows what turn his son's mind and life might have taken? As to the religious atmosphere in which Nietzsche was brought up, he saw more conventional, traditional practice than individual knowledge and active faith. Rationalistic theories, which in the first half of the 19th century had taken hold of men's minds, still cast their shadows upon theological and religious ideas. Nietzsche himself gives us the following picture:—

> "By the Deathbed of Christianity:" The really active men of to-day are, in their hearts, without Christianity, and the more moderate and circum-

spect of average mentality have now only a prepared, that is to say, a wonderfully simplified Christianity. A God who, in his love, so ordains everything as in the end would have been best, — a God who gives and takes our virtues as he gives and takes our happiness: — resignation and humility raised to godliness, the best and most vital that yet remains of Christianity. One should, howewer, note that Christianity at the same time has solved into a gentle morality. Good will and decent sentiments have remained.

In the educational establishment in which Nietzsche laid the foundation of his thorough classical knowledge, he underwent the religious training of the day; feeling the conflict between the Christian and Greek conception of life, he took more interest in critical examination than in personal experience. Tormented by doubt and a determined spirit of opposition, the student, as it is well known, was deeply influenced by Schopenhauer's metaphysical and ethical conception which became the starting point of his hostile position towards Christian thought. Schopenhauer's Christianism is more or less a synonym of Buddhism: renunciation and resignation, deliverance and redemption are the chief points. Howewer the famous pessimist forgot that the Buddhist aims at nothingness, decomposition and death, whereas the Christian has a sanctified natural and a purified eternal life in view.

Another so – called Christian feature that Schopenhauer and Nietzsche bring into prominence is the erroneous interpretation of Matth. V. 3. In speaking of "the poor in spirit" (those who feel poor, guilty and humble before God) could Jesus have thought of weakminded creatures, blockheads or simpletons? From his early youth Nietzsche was conscious of his excellent intellectual gifts; is it to be wondered at that, inclined to satire as he was, he willingly sneered at the simpleminded disciples of Christ, as Schopenhauer and, who knows how many representative men of intellect and reason, had done before?

Schopenhauer's "Will to Life" and his conviction of the power of instinct gave a new turn to Nietzsche's thought. Prone to change and criticism, he soon learned to "burn what he had adored and to adore what he had burned." Had Schopenhauer said "Nay" to life, Nietzsche after many a sidelong glance at humanism, positivism and naturalism, became an enthusiast of optimism, whose fascinating watch-word "Yea to life" grew to be the great point of attraction for his numerous juvenile admirers. Rejecting Schopenhauer's views on world and mankind in general, Nietzsche stuck to the former's partial mediaeval and imperfect conception of Christian theories. Believing in instinctive will to power in all the doings and activities of man, pleading for a fuller and richer life, for spontaneous individuality, for a complete self-reliant personality, the misunderstood Christian contempt for the world and the flesh, the Christian "destructive virtues, the Christian spiritual and intellectual bondage" provoked resentment, wrath and hatred in Nietzsche's intense soul, so that we may even ask if the "Superman" is not the antithesis of the mediaeval Christian ideal.

Schopenhauer's final conviction that life means suffering gave rise to his altruistic tendencies and caused him to declare pity the first ethical demand. His opponent Nietzsche fighte against sympathy with misery and pain, calling pity a "depressive, delusive Christian virtue" which, instead of raising and encouraging man, weakens his will and energy besides humiliating him who is pitied, and awakening undeserved satisfaction, if not pride, in him who pities! Freethinkers and supermen therefore must fight against commiseration, they must be morally clothed in mail and become hard to themselves and others. These assumptions and demands have given rise to numerous misinterpretations. We know that in private life the creator of the "superman" was known to be kind, courteous and considerate to all who approached him. We also know that our friend of contradiction and individual interpretation recommends a "higher far-sighted compassion" and last not least, we as well know that the most objectionable phrase which testifies to Nietzsche's cruelty; the well -known "Death to the weak" is part of an aphorism, the context of which clearly shows that in no way did the author direct this exhortation to man, but speaks of Christian morals, which according to his conviction were no longer able to lead mankind onwards in life, to strengthen and elevate. The aphorism in question reads thus: — "Now it is advisable to remove the remains of religious life, because they are flabby and unfruitful and weaken devotion to a proper aim. Death to the weak!" (IX 182). Who knows if Nietzsche's impious, contemptuous outburst: — "God is dead" was originally an audacious assertion, or a simple statement?

Now to another side of the question! Pity being objectionable, Nietzsche asks if there is no blessing in sorrow and suffering. A detailed study of his life plainly reveals to what a degree he himself had experienced the value of physical and mental pain. In

his readiness to suffer he undoubtedly agrees with Musset when he said: "L'homme est un apprenti, la douleur est son maître". Nietzsche himself exclaims: "The discipline of suffering, of great suffering, know ye not that it is only this discipline that has produced all the elevations of humanity hitherto?" The capacity for suffering, in Nietzsche's opinion, even indicates man's social rank. Social rank however, is another of Nietzsche's preoccupations and gave him further cause to deny and attack Christianity.

The fact that the family of Nietzsche was of noble Polish descent is probable, but not yet sufficiently proved. Our philosopher, although the advocate of the highest moral aims and a scoffer at human weakness, has a great "faible" for his noble origin and boasts of being an aristocrat. Aristocracy, to him, a priori the centre of high qualities, thus became the object of his ethical researches. He rages against socialistic and democratic tendencies, against the "far too many" and ends by publishing two different codes of morals, the one for the slaves, the other for the masters. How then can he approve the equality of man, the value of every individual soul? The doctrine of human nature's corruptness and worthlessness that preaches this humility, self-denial, contrition and crucifiction of the will and the flesh may be good enough for slaves, for humanity on the whole it means decay of the race, destruction of noble insincts, decadence and ruin of aristocratic feeling.

These few details may suffice to show Nietzsche's deficient knowledge of Christian doctrines and principles. They give us the right to repudiate his accusations, for is it not the first duty of a critic to know himself what he attacks and rejects? The author of "The Antichrist" had lent a willing ear to the detractors of Christianity, without testing their accusations by conscientious study. This is all the more astonishing as Nietzsche did not generally take things for granted and faced men and things with open eyes. However here too, Nietzsche follows the example of many others, Christianity having always been judged by many and understood by few. At any rate, concerning Christianity, Nietzsche lost his way, he was led into a blind alley and fought "as one who beateth the air", and so missed the mark.

Had he only diligently searched in the Gospel, or in the lives of great Christians, he might have recognised what a superior model for a superman, (he who best enjoys life because he has mastered it), a Christian can be and what a different scale of valuation Christians have, as compared with the children of the world! As for the fatal "Nay to life", which human organisations have discovered, did Nietzsche never read what St. Paul writes, Cor. II, 1. v. 19? "Jesus Christ was neither Yea nor Nay, but in Him was Yea!"

Now, if Nietzsche missed the mark in fighting against Christ's theories, in his cutting remarks on the manifestations of Christian morals as he saw them practiced in "the pale cast of life" of the Christians around him, unfortunately his blows went home, and with many others who have turned their back on the religion of their fathers, he might have said: "The Christians themselves roused me against Christianity." It is true his negative conception of the latter did not hinder him from admitting in other moments, that the few "model men" he had met had been Christians. The "every day Christian" he calls a "lamentable figure" Zarathustra expects Christians "to sing better hymns and to look more redeemed." Nietzsché emphatically chastises Christians by name who think themselves accomplished, perfect and saved and repress moral effort and weaken moral strength.

According to Frau Dr. E. Förster-Nietzsche, the two worst, most reprehensible and blasphemous antichristian pamphlets, "The Antichrist" and "Ecce Homo", dating from the last solitary years of the suffering, forsaken and broken down thinker, were not intended for publication. Therefore, are they really worth taking quite in earnest? A passage in the "Antichrist" speaks very highly of our controversialist esteem for practical Christianity "Alone, the practice of Christianity as exemplified by Him who died on the Cross is Christian and demands not belief, but accomplishment, the difference is not in the action and doing, or in the not-doing, but above all in the being". Antich. 39. VIII. p. 265.

Curious as it is, a genial writer, philosopher and moralist, whom Nietzsche most highly appreciated, to whom he devoted his most friendly feelings, whom he loved and admired, the great French mathematician Blaise Pascal was an adherent of strict Roman Catholic principles. Having overcome intellectualism and doubt, he became a powerful, ingenious apologist, a great defender of faith. This surprising predeliction of Nietzsche's may partly be explained by the extraordinary congeniality of the two thinkers. These two great intellects, both men of intense and delicate feeling, of powerful will, enemies of half measures, were both, though in different ways, passionate fighters for truth and severe monitors of their contemporaries. As Nietzsche himself admits, Pascal's self-discipline self restraint, his vigour and resoluteness became a

standard to him. In the great mathematician's devotedness to clerical organisation, rules and prescriptions, in his humility, renunciation and asceticism, Nietzsche saw his fiercest enemies, and the destroyers of the great and pious moralist's mind and life. Numerous quotations are keen reflections on Nietzsche's deeply felt interest for the celebrated Frenchman. Striking passages clearly reveal that Nietzsche's hatred of Christianity arose from his sincere sympathy with the austere representative of asceticism.

> "Mankind should never forgive Christianity for having ruined such a man as Pascal. One should never cease to battle against just this in Christianity, namely, that it has the will to shatter the strongest and noblest souls . . . One should never relax one's efforts to destroy, root and branch, the ideal type in mankind which was conceived by Christianity. The utterly absurd remains of the Christian fable, "conceptional spiderwebs" and theology do not concern us; it could be a thousand times more absurd and we would never raise a finger against it. But we do battle against every ideal which, with its sickly beauty and effeminate seduction — with the hidden calumny of its eloquence, leads the tired soul — (and the strongest have their weary moments) — into ways of cowardice and vanity with the result that, which might appear the most useful and desirable, — faith, guidelessness, unpretentiousness, forebearance, love of one's fellowmen, resignation, devotion to God, — are but a kind of unharnessing and abdication of its whole ego.
>
> What we fight in Christianity is its determination to crush the strong — to demoralize their spirit — to take advantage of their moments of depression and lassitude — to turn their proud confidence into unrest and doubt — because it tends to undermine and poison the high natural instincts until their strength and will are made a force reacting against itself — until the strong, through excesses of selfmortification and self-inflicted torture, are annihilated . . . Have we not the most noted example of this gastly method of destruction in Pascal? XV. 155/56.

Indeed such lines afford us the best key to Nietzsche's position towards Christianity, his incomplete and false conception of Christ's doctrine, medieval narrowness, anxiety and anguish prevented the Lutheran pastor's son from knowing the great German Reformer's victorious faith and his sublime joy in the redemption.

In his last volume Nietzsche speaks of „Pascalism" as a mixture of Buddhistic pessimism, Christian ascetism, and mysticism. In one of his last letters to the Danish critic Brandes, Nietzsche calls Pascal "the only logical Christian," to whom he owes "infinite instruction." Raoul Richter, one of the best interpreters of Nietzsche's philosophy, declares Nietzsche: "an unhappy lover of Christianity." Unfortunately his love, if love it was, turned into bitter hate. According to the philosopher Simmel, "a considerable measure of Christian and Nietschean valuations are on the same lines."

What is most to be deplored is Nietzsche's influence upon inexperienced, half-hearted, luke warm Christians. Numbers, it is said, thus had their convictions shaken, but would they ever have been living souls among Christ's followers? What most grieves and afflicts us is the fact that this fatal influence of Nietzsche's not only spread in his own country but went far beyond German frontiers. From numbers of foreign pulpits one hears that Germany is the centre of irreligion and atheism, and that German unbelief and godlessness found adequate incarnation in the author of Zarathustra! No doubt Nietzsche's empathic language and style made things worse, but who can assert that this evident decline and decrease of religion and faith are not universal? Nietzsche spent the greater part of his life abroad, he had a great predilection for France and undoubtedly drew sensible influence from numerous French irreligious writers. Germany to day affords, it is true, a sad, revolting and repulsive picture of extravagances, misery and moral decadence, but physically and morally gagged as the whole nation is, will she ever be able to recover under these circumstances? Nevertheless, Germany has always been the cradle and the home of a great longing, deep yearning and arduous desire, for high ideals, intellectual researches, for an intense mental and moral life. We sincerely hope therefore, that better feeling, purer aspirations and higher aims will conquer the moral tendencies of the day. Had Nietzsche's earnest warnings been heard in time, he would fully have atoned for his deplorable influence upon religious life. In his preface to "The Dawn of the Day" the author advises his readers to "Learn to read him well" — Indeed there is still much to be done. To those who are willing to hear, Nietsche gives sound and severc advice, he also addressed many a confounding word to the Christians of all times.

With reference to his attacks upon Christianity he gave the following explanation: — "I have declared war upon the anaemic Christian ideal, not with an intention of annihilating it, but in order to put an end to its tyranny and to make room for new ideals, for more robust ideals." Believing in man's own instincts, impulses and faculties, "this atheist by religion" wanted to replace religion by discipline and education.

His own theories and precepts are strict and austere. Disgusted with contemporary life and unrelenting towards himself, he challenges humanity to battle and fight. Stimulation, encouragement, will to life, and joy in struggle, these are the leading points of Nietzsche's ethical demands. Life was the object of all his inquiries, the fullest possible life his ideal. Himself a hero-worshipper, he readily joined with the poet and forcibly calls upon man "Be a hero in the strife."

Economy in the Crisis of our Time.

A Lecture by ***.

We presently live in a double crisis. We have an acute crisis as one of the consequences of the Treaty of Versailles. Besides this, there is a chronic crisis of a spiritual character, the beginnings of which are to be dated some centuries ago. It is only this latter crisis we have to deal with. Looking back to the last centuries, we notice as a characteristic peculiarity a striking disagreement: uncertainty and absence of direction in the spiritual sphere, and on the other hand clear-sighted progressive development and increasing power of Economy. Where is the cause of this discrepancy? Which are its symptoms? How is it to be overcome?

The present position of Economy can only be understood as developed in connection with universal history. In Antiquity the State was the highest aim, Economy being only one of the means to this end without having any purpose in itself. There were, it is true, contrary tendencies to attribute a greater importance to Economy. With the rising of Christianity we at first find a more negative attitude towards Economy. Transcendental things are almost exclusively predominant. But when Christianity grew more and more into a world-power, the problem arose how to find a connection between Christian doctrines and Economy. This was the great problem of the Middle-Ages, definitively solved by Thomas of Aquino. A sequence of purposes is established in which also Economy gets its place. Henceforth, it is a mere agent of the individual to fulfil his religious duties.

Modern times are essentially different from Antiquity and the Middle-Ages: from Middle-Ages by their chiefly un-transcendental character; from Antiquity by their not starting from the whole, but from details, by not knowing solid masses and limits, but by their being pushed forward by a strong impulse of motion. This fundamental character of modern times will explain why Economy henceforth gains more and more in importance.

But within modern times, two periods are clearly to be distinguished

In the first, the old restrictions are still prevailing: on one hand Religion and on the other the State. The Reformation puts the question to every one: in favour of which confession have I to decide? These facts brought religious life far more into the foreground than in former times. Even when in the 17th century, the great religious controversies lost of their importance, the religious feeling of the individual remained unaltered and was not without influence on economic undertakings.

But it was not only to Religion that Economy remained subordinate. There arose the new modern State that tried to subordinate all provinces of life. The formation of this State was partly due to urgent political requirements of that time, and partly to the antique model. In spite of this the organisation of the modern State was quite different from the antique State: for the ideal of the modern State is not the antique city-State, but a centralising national State But on the other hand, the difference between the modern and the antique State is especially to be found in its relation to Economy. Economy was no longer regarded as the means to realise a given purpose, but as the means to increase the power of the State, a power which seemed to have no limits. In this, all mercantilists agree. Thus, Economy was subordinate to Religion and to the State in the first period of modern times.

In the second period, since the French Revolution, a change was brought about. Economy became prominent by external causes, above all: the increase of the population, the progress of technics, and the new social contrasts. At the same time the progress

of civilisation in the "enlightened age" of rationalism gradually destroyed the predominance of the State and of Religion; for it preferred the realities of reason to the revealed truth of Religion, and the State was thought to be created by single individuals to serve their own interests. Thus, in the second period of modern times, Economy necessarily became the dominating power promoted by these external facts and by the simultaneous receding of those higher ideals.

How is the predominance of Economy manifested? Economical advantages above all stimulate the individual. With a few exceptions the individual always thinks how much will that which I propose doing increase my material income and my personal power? But likewise Economy has got a decisive influence on the social structure of human society. In the first period of modern times, it was the State that had this great influence on society in general. But to-day social classification is based on economical distinctions such as employers and employed, producer and consumer. It is the Society of Political Economy, as Lorenz von Stein calls it. Further on, the predominance of Economy is also manifested in the ideals which the present generation has formed of its future. It is from Economy that Marxism, the most widely spread of these ideals, starts in trying to change present conditions. Finally, the fact that our thoughts are entirely absorbed by economical questions has also influenced the science of history. Thus in all provinces of life the predominance of Economy is evident.

This is one of the decisive facts responsible for the present crisis of civilisation: On one hand the lack of a universally acknowledged aim of humanity to which Economy had to subordinate itself; on the other a strong feeling of discontent with Economy that has found its purpose in itself. In this respect our time urges us to subordinate Economy to higher aims; the realisation of which is, however, extremely difficult, as the predominance of Economy is partly caused, as has been demonstrated, by objective facts which are still strongly prevailing.

From all this we conclude that the crisis of our civilisation cannot be mastered by an economical revolution alone, as for instance marxistic socialism tries to do. On the other hand, all those ideals are sure to fail that simply ignore the economical difficulties. In this, we find the bounds set to German Humanism, in which ideas essential to the overcoming of the crisis are included. We have to start from a higher world of ideals and fully to acknowledge the economical problems of our time. Only in this way the crisis can be overcome. (Translated by R.)

In Memory of Kant.

By Rudolf Eucken.

On the 12th of February 1904 there was, as is known, a celebration in memory of Kant, and all civilised nations endeavour to remember what mankind owes to the scientific work of this great philosopher. Therefore we also wish to point to the everlasting importance of this man. We follow the essay which Rudolf Eucken wrote in 1904 in German language and which has been translated into English by Mr. Meyrick Booth; our readers, whose attention we should like to draw to his translation, will find it printed under the title "Collective Essays" of Rudolf Eucken, Translated by Meyrick Booth (Fisher Unwin, Publishers. London 1914). This book has found many friends in the English world.

What then is new and revolutionary in Kant? It is first and foremost this, that here, for the first time, the supremacy of morality is made scientifically secure. And this is effected precisely through the transformation and limitation of knowledge with which we have dealt. For previous assertion of the unique value of morality did not remove the doubt whether there was any place at all for morality (with the freedom of action which is necessary to it) in a reality such as ours. In particular the strengthening which was imparted by modern science to the idea of a thoroughgoing causal connection worked directly against any independence on the part of morality. Now Kant converted the causal connection from an order inherent in the things themselves into a law of our thought; and since in this way its validity did not extend beyond our circle of ideas, since it remained confined to our human conception of the world, free scope was left for other developments; and a moral kingdom could unfold itself without obstacle if imperative facts speaking for it were at hand. And that they were at hand Kant endeavoured to show with the whole power and depth of his soul; in no cause was his personality more heartily engaged. His work gains an incomparable greatness through the fact that he discovers in morality a new fundamental relationship of man to reality, the point of departure of a new world. Morality, he shows, is not a means to mere happiness; and to treat it thus is inwardly to destroy it. It is far superior to all self-seeking and all self-will; it speaks to us with an imperative "Ought," with the compulsion of a strict duty. But at the same time its concept involves the idea that it can never be imposed from without, never be dictated by an alien power. For then it would

operate only through the expectation of reward and punishment, thereby sinking back under the power of the very motive forces above which it should elevate us. There remains as sole possibility, that the origin of morality lies in the spiritual being of man himself; that it is our own inmost will which imposes the moral order. This, however, accomplishes a great transformation in our conception of man; he now becomes the bearer of a new world, of a supersensuous reality: through creative activity he gains part in absolute truth and is thereby elevated far above all the standards of the realm of experience. The valuation of morality as that which alone gives value to our life and being (which always formed a portion of Kant's deepest conviction) now acquires a complete scientific basis and an inward consolidation; the inexpressible labour of the investigator leads ultimately to a confirmation of his innermost, purely human being. Hence the joyous tone in which Kant often breaks out when developing his moral ideas—a tone which forms a remarkable contrast to the usual sobriety of his work.

Thus, ultimately, the affirmative element in Kant's work obtains the upper hand. He is and remains a critical thinker, but still more is he a positive thinker; and as such he can employ the negative to advance the positive, and in the ultimate consideration of our life and capacity find, "that the unfathomable wisdom, by virtue of which we exist, is not less worthy of honour in that which it forbids to us than in that which it permits to us." The powerful movements in opposite directions which run through Kant's thought-world, and the continual presence of a negation even in the affirmation, give his philosophy a peculiar and very characteristic atmosphere and maintain it in constant movement. Nowhere is there dull tranquillity and mere enjoyment, on every hand we find activity, work, conflict.

If, going beyond the antithesis of theoretical and practical reason, we seek to sum up Kant's work as a unity, we cannot fail to recognise in it a great crisis in the modern movement towards the subject. This movement was already in progress; the Renaissance and the Reformation had prepared its path: and in philosophy Descartes had brought it to mastery. But Kant immensely strengthened the movement: for, on the theoretical side, he liberated man from the pressure of an external world, and, in the sphere of the moral life, rejected all action based upon mere authority, as a subversion of moral freedom. At the same time, however, he essentially deepened the subject and liberated it from all mere confinement to special points; for he recognised in the subject, an intellectual structure (of thought) and an entire world (of moral action). In this way he placed it upon the safest (and what is, according to our own conviction, the only possible) path, a path powerfully elevating it above all mere egotism and self-will. Even if the execution frequently remained incomplete, Kant turned our efforts along the right and necessary path; he pointed out the sole possible manner in which freedom and law, activity and depth, inwardness and world-life, can be brought together, instead of being left in their usual hostility to one another. That wich he effected for the strengthening and deepening of the subject acquires an immense impressiveness more particularly through the fact that it does not develop from the subject itself, as a consequence of its wishes or feelings, but from the matter itself and following upon its necessity. The thinker transfers himself within its demands and shows that, taken as strictly as they must be taken, these can find no other solution than through taking the matter back to the subject. In this way there is accomplished a vast transformation in favour of the subject, without any sort of direct appeal to the subject, and entirely without any obsequiousness towards it. Precisely in this way is the matter most securely made good, the path most decisively indicated.

From all Parts of the Globe.

An Indefatigable Australian Champion of Liberty and Moral Uplift.

The Reverend Charles Strong, D. D., of Melbourne, is famous beyond the frontiers of his own country as an acknowledged and outstanding champion of the cause of true Humanity and of vital Religion. The periodical review, "The Commonweal", which he edits, deals fully and faithfully with all the religious questions of the time; and all the outstanding problems of Social Life, Education and the Administration of the Law, etc., are thoroughly and luminously discussed. A continual effort for mutual understanding, and for the union and friendship of Nations, is Dr. Strong's main objective. It should be of interest to all foreigners to be informed as to the particular problems which mainly engross the attention of the English-speaking world. The following lines are typical of the point-of-view maintained throughout his articles:

Breaking down Old Barriers.

The old sectarian distinctions are slowly being submerged in the light of the larger conceptions of Religion and the Gospel. It is only ignorance and false conservatism and property that bar the way to the flowing tide. What do the majority of people know or care about the distinctions between Calvinist and Arminian and Socinin, Baptist, Presbyterian, Anglican and Congregation, all supposed to be founded on some external infallible authority? So we find clergymen passing from one denomination to another and the old lines of demarcation fading away, as in the case of men like Dean Inge and the Modernists in all the churches. Dr. Orchard, a Presbyterian, occupies the pulpit of King's Weigh House, a Congregational Church. Dr. Norwood, a Baptist, is minister of the Congregational City Temple, and a Presbyterian succeeds Dr. Jowett, while a Unitarian occupies the pulpit of Pembroke Chapel.

A significant discussion concerning an article by H. G. Wells which appeared in the February issue of "Pearson's Magazine":—

Mr. G. H. Wells has called forth responses from bishops and clergymen. And it is a good thing when an angel comes down and troubles the pool. Perhaps, however, he does not recognise, or is not aware of, the leaven that is working, and has for years been working, in the churches, preparing the way for Mr. Wells, and clearing away the accreations that, through past ages, have gathered around "the teachings of Jesus of Nazareth," and the obscurations caused by the industrial, economic, scientific, political, social, literary and military environment of to-day. Mr. Wells admits that he has little help to give in the way of reconstruction; but he helps to stir us all up and to wake the sleepers. "Reconstructions", however, must be the motto. And many are working at it to-day, and have for long been working, seeking to inspire with the fresh and larger faith in God, a faith to which, we read, "all things are possible," and to adapt the message of Jesus to this knowledge, life, and conditions of to-day.

Inspiration is what is, above all things, wanted, together with practical co-operation; and these are not to be found in critical isolation. "Wherever Christ is," we may say, with an ancient "Father", "there is the Church"; but meaning that the Christ-spirit is essentially social, and can flourish only in a brotherhood of spiritis. Let Mr. Wells now help us to this. We know the negative, the "Everlasting Nay." Now for the "Everlasting Yea," which alone can bind us together.

The international Public should read with care the contents of this intensely spiritual and characteristic periodical "The Commonweal", from which there is, indeed, much to be learned.

A Famous Swedish Philosopher.

Vitalis Norström (obiit 1916) was Professor of Philosophy at Gothenburg and member of the Swedish Academy at Stockholm: he was also the foremost philosophical thinker produced by Sweden during the past century. At the outset of his career, he followed the doctrines of his teacher, Boström; but later he followed his own initiative; and, as his powerful ethical idealism became more and more bound up with his intellectual theories, he secured for Religion a prominent place therein, and strove to place his philosophical superiority in the foreground. These articles display a supreme combination of depth, warmth, and an impressive ideas.

The International Congress of Moral Education of 1922.

The suggestion to hold a congress of moral education came from London. In this city the first congress was held in September 1908, the second took place at the Hague in 1912, the third in Geneva in 1922, and the fourth is to take place at Rome in 1926. From November 1912 till June 1923 Sir Frederic Pollock Bart. London, was president. With a never ceasing zeal, that gentleman applied himself to the task set; the same can be said of the Hon. Secretary, Mr. Frederic S. Gould of Armosel Avenue, Ealing, London W. 5, Woodfield.

The fundamental idea is to improve the moral education of all nations by means of a general work done in community. Certainly one can be convinced that the task set is beyond any spirit of party as well as it is beyond the dissensions existing between the different nations. The chief aim of the enterprise is to bring the nations to an understanding thus preparing a sound basis for an exchange of reciprocal experiences. The last congress treated the theme of: "Teaching of History and Social Service." Five hundred people attended the Meeting of 1922, these people representing thirty nations. In July 1923, the documents handed over to the congress were published, a glance at them offers an interesting picture of the movement that is going on in the Ethic and Pedagogic domain. Moreover, it is a pleasure to state that during the congress not the slightest divergence occurred which might have wounded the feelings of a member having different opinions, thus a kind of an ethial solidarity has in fact been proved.

From the scientific point of view, these meetings may of course be discussed but there is no doubt whatever, that they are of unquestionable value as they give the expression to the tendencies of the time, by the same occasion fortifying too the connections between the single personalities. Nations, nowadays, having more hostile feelings against one another than ever, the case stated above is a very important one.

Therefore one can but express the very best wishes for the next congress that is to be held at Rome.

American Opinion on a German Psychologist's Work.

In the copy of **"The American Review of Reviews"** issued in July, an article is devoted to the recent work of the so celebrated German psychologist, Professor A. Wreschner, upon the different moral qualities in both sexes during their process of development. The American paper refers to an article of the "Naturwissenschaftliche Umschau" (Berlin) and says in regard to Professor Wreschner's so very fine and interesting observations that as he states himself: the difference of the two sexes complies no disadvantage, each being most highly gifted in that domain in which it is most capable of acting. But he thinks it unwise to give the two sexes a uniform education.

Religious Problems in India.

The Hindoo periodical, "World Peace", published in Calcutta, writes in the copy of July 19th — 1923, together with some interesting articles, a very important one on: **"The new Conception of Religion."**

We cannot enter here into particulars as to our standing to the questions developed therein, but there can be no doubt whatever that, nowadays, there is a strong longing for religion to be stated throughout the world and that, a thorough reformation of the historical religions is wanted. It is gratifying indeed, even edifying, when we state that certain fundamental characteristics of the tendency are, at the present time, identical for all the different forms of religious life. As far as India is concerned, it is to be remarked, that the "World" and the action directed by the "World", has attained a much greater intellectual importance than is usual in this country, thus bestowing a more active character to Indian life.

We should like to quote but a few lines from the above mentioned article (pg. 38):

> "The old religion wanted the seekers after God to renounce the world as Maya or illusion, giving thereby only a partial and mutilated view of the Eternal Truth. But the new religion has given us a philosophy of life that teaches us to look upon the world as a manifestation of God himself, as an expression of the Good, the True and the Beautiful."

We state herein a tendency towards Unity, Space, Humanity, and this tendency must be acknowledged, but there is a danger in this manner of thinking as it may lead too much towards Emancipation of mind and that thus the problem of "Evil" as well as inner conflicts of human nature are not enough considered.

Religious and Clerical Movement in America.

"The American Review of Reviews" writes in its copy of July about a religious and clerical movement and a struggle that is now taking place in that country. Presbyterian and Baptist Churches joined in the struggle and a controversy arose between the Fundamentalists and the Liberals, or Progressives, so called. The movement thus created, engendered a very remarkable declaration as to the relation of religion and science in which prominent learned men as well as leading clergymen have joined. The tenor of this declaration is as follows:—

> We, the undersigned, deeply regret that in recent controversies there has been a tendency to present science and religion as irreconcilable and antagonistic domains of thought, for in fact they meet distinct human needs, and in the rounding out of human life they supplement rather than displace or oppose each other.
>
> The purpose of science is to develop, without prejudice or preconception of any kind, a knowledge of the facts, the laws, and the processes of nature. The even more important task of religion, on the other hand, is to develop the consciences, the ideals, and the aspirations of mankind. Each of these two activities represents a deep and vital function of the soul of man, and both are necessary for the life, the progress, and the happiness of the human race.

German Origin of most Songs and Tunes.

According to the Swedenborg Journal **"Messenger of the New Church"** (St. Louis, Sept. 1st) the Hymnologist Doving states the fact that most songs and tunes come of the rich German treasure of songs, Luther and Paul Gerhardt being appreciated most. Luther's song: 'A Stronghold is our God' has, according to Doving, been translated into 70 languages.

Editorial.

We regret very much that, owing to present distressed circumstances which grew worse and worse since October last, it was impossible to us to publish The Eucken Review in regular succession. We request our readers to excuse and understand this. We have now succeeded in having this copy printed, which, however, must be the last of the issue of 1923. But we are glad to say that we have overcome the worst difficulties and hope to be able to make a fresh start and send our Review henceforth regularly each month, the first number, of January 1924, just coming from the printing press.

NATURALISM OR IDEALISM

Discoures delivered by RUDOLF EUCKEN

in December 1909 at Stockholm

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